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Executive Registry

61-67652

30 AUG 1961

General Samuel V. Griffith *card*

Dear General Griffith:

Many thanks for your "Introduction to Mao's Yu Chi Chan", which I have passed on to our GW Staff for further study. Your capsule summaries and conclusions are particularly appreciated, and are still in process of being digested. With Mao's effort rapidly attaining the status of a classic in its field, valid interpretation will be of continuing interest.

I plan to hold you to your written commitment to provide me with an author's complimentary copy of your upcoming translation of Sun Tzu's Art of War. In the meantime, your choice of locale for the summer months cannot be faulted. In closing let me say that many of your old friends in the Agency send their regards as do I.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Allen W. Dulles
Director

CG/DDCI

Original - Addressee

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Signature Recommended:

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8 AUG 1961

Deputy Director (Plans)

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY)

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DD/P/4551

Executive Summary

24 AUG 1961

61-6765/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on General Sam Griffith's
Introduction to Mao Tse Tung's
Yu Chi Chan.

1. This memorandum requests action on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence, in the form of signing the attached personal letter to General Samuel V. Griffith. General Griffith has forwarded to you a draft of his Introduction to his original translation of Mao Tse Tung's Yu Chi Chan.

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2. In the estimate of the [redacted] General Griffith's introduction is a tangible contribution to the interpretation of Mao Tse Tung's classic. So long as General Griffith's effort is viewed in the above light, it can scarcely be faulted.

3. If the General's interpretation is regarded as a global reference point for GW, it becomes misleading and subject to valid difference of opinion. For example, there is no reference to nationalism as a factor, and to full outside provocation. Again using the global spectrum, it is felt that the insistence on political indoctrination will not hold up. (The Meos would tend to refute this - their political sophistication, if any, is minimal; they are fighting to maintain their home land. This applies also to the Spanish guerrilla effort in the Napoleonic wars, which he cites). Exception is also taken to the concept that once Phase One is completed (political indoctrination of the masses), the process is not reversible. [redacted]

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4. In sum, if viewed as General Griffith may have intended it to be, i. e., interpretation of Mao's work, limited to China, the effort is a solid contribution.

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61-6765



12 August 1961

Dear Mr. Dulles,

I must apologize for having taken so long to get this to you.

Praeger, who will publish this "Introduction" together with my original translation of Mao's Yu Chi Chan as "Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla War" on 13 October put me on a "crash" schedule.

We are enjoying it very much here, and I am proceeding all out on revision of my Oxford doctoral thesis, which will be published in the spring by the Clarendon Press. This is a new and I hope definitive translation of Sun Tzu's classic "Art of War", with a six chapter "Introduction" by me.

I will see that you get an author's complimentary copy of each of these earth-shaking tomes.

With best regards,

Sam Ginsburg

INTRODUCTION

I

The Nature of Revolutionary Guerrilla War

" - - - - the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti-Japanese struggle, but will be world-wide."

Mao Tse-tung, Yu Chi Chan, 1937

At one end of the spectrum, ranks of electronic boxes buried deep in the earth hungrily consume data and spew out endless tapes. Scientists and engineers confer in air-conditioned offices; missiles are checked by intense men who move about them silently, almost reverently. In forty minutes count-down begins.

At the other end of this spectrum a tired man wearing a greasy felt hat, a tattered shirt and soiled shorts is seated, his back against a tree. Barrel pressed between his knees, butt resting on the moist earth between sandalled feet, a Browning automatic rifle. Hooked to his belt, two dirty canvas sacks, one holding three home-made bombs, the other four magazines loaded with .30 calibre ammunition. Draped around his neck, a sausage-like cloth tube with three days' supply of rice. The man stands, raises a water bottle to his lips, rinses his mouth, spits out the water. He looks about him carefully, corks the bottle, slaps the stock of the Browning three times, pauses, slaps it again twice, and

disappears silently into the shadows. In forty minutes his group of fifteen men will occupy a previously prepared ambush.

It is probable that guerrilla war, nationalist and revolutionary in nature, will flare up in one or more of half a dozen countries during the next few years. These outbreaks may not initially be inspired, organized or led by local communists - indeed, it is probable that they will not be. But they will receive the moral support and vocal encouragement of international Communism, and where circumstances permit, expert advice and material assistance as well.

As early as November 1949 we had this assurance from China's Number Two Communist, Liu Shao-ch'i, when, speaking before the Australasian Trade Unions Conference in Peking, he prophesied that there would be other Asian revolutions which would follow the Chinese pattern. We paid no attention to this warning.

In December 1960 delegates of eighty-one Communist and Workers parties resolved that the tempo of "wars of liberation" should be stepped up. Exactly a month later (6 January 1961) the Soviet Premier, an unimpeachable authority on "national liberation wars", propounded an interesting series of questions to which he provided equally interesting answers:

"Is there a likelihood of such wars recurring? Yes, there is. Are uprisings of this kind likely to recur? Yes, they are. But wars of this kind are popular uprisings. Is there the likelihood of conditions in other coun-

tries reaching the point where the cup of the popular patience overflows and they take to arms? Yes, there is such a likelihood. What is the attitude of the Marxists to such uprisings? A most favorable attitude. . . . These uprisings are directed against the corrupt reactionary regimes, against the colonialists. The Communists support just wars of this kind wholeheartedly and without reservations."

World Marxist Review, January 1961

Implicit is the further assurance that any popular movement infiltrated and captured by the communists will develop an anti-western character definitely tinged, in our own hemisphere at least, with a distinctive anti-American coloration.

This should not surprise us if we remember that several hundred millions less fortunate than we have arrived, perhaps reluctantly, at the conclusion that the western peoples are dedicated to the perpetuation of the political, social and economic status quo. In the not too distant past many of these millions looked hopefully to America, Britain or France for help toward the realization of their justifiable aspirations. But today many of them feel that these aims can be achieved only by a desperate revolutionary struggle which we will probably oppose. This is not an hypothesis, it is fact.

A potential revolutionary situation exists in any country where the government consistently fails in its obligation to insure at least a minimally decent standard of life for the great majority of its citizens. If there also exists even the nucleus of a revolutionary party able to supply doctrine and organization there remains but one missing

ingredient: the instrument for violent revolutionary action.

In many countries there are but two classes, the rich and the miserably poor. In these countries the relatively small middle class - merchants, bankers, doctors, lawyers, engineers - lacks forceful leadership, is fragmented by unceasing factional quarrels and is politically ineffective. Its program, which usually posits a socialized society and some form of liberal parliamentary democracy, is anathema to the exclusive and tightly knit possessing minority. It is also rejected by the frustrated intellectual youth who move irrevocably toward violent revolution. To the illiterate and destitute, it represents a package of promises which experience tells them will never be fulfilled.

People who live at subsistence level want first things to be put first. They are not particularly interested in freedom of religion, freedom of the press, free enterprise as we understand it, or the secret ballot. Their needs are more basic: land, tools, fertilizers, something better than rags for their children, a house instead of a shack, freedom from police oppression, medical attention, primary schools. Those who have known only poverty have begun to wonder why they should continue to wait passively. They see - and not always through red-tinted glasses - examples of peoples who have changed the structure of their societies and they ask, "What have we to lose?" When a great many people begin to ask themselves this question, a revolutionary guerrilla situation is incipient.

A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, of variable importance, are military, political, economic, social and psychological. For this reason it is endowed with a dynamic quality and a dimension in depth which orthodox wars, of whatever scale, lack. This is particularly true of revolutionary guerrilla war, which is not susceptible to the type of superficial military treatment frequently advocated by antediluvian doctrinaires.

It is often said that guerrilla warfare is primitive. This general-

ization is dangerously misleading and true only in the technological sense. If one considers the picture as a whole a paradox is immediately apparent and the primitive form is seen to be in fact more sophisticated than nuclear war or atomic war or war as it was waged by conventional armies, navies and air forces. Guerrilla war is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. It can be conducted in any terrain, in any climate, in any weather; in swamps, in mountains, in farmed fields, ~~in forests~~. Its basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines. He is endowed with intelligence, emotions and will. Guerrilla warfare is therefore suffused with, and reflects, man's admirable qualities as well as his less pleasant ones. While it is not always humane, it is human, which is more than can be said for the strategy of extinction.

In the United States we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake. A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a home-made bomb. His indoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man.

Guerrilla leaders spend a great deal more time in organization,

instruction, agitation and propaganda work than they do fighting. For their most important job is to win over the people. "We must patiently explain," says Mao Tse-tung. "Explain", "persuade", "discuss", "convince" - these words recur with monotonous regularity in many of the early Chinese essays on guerrilla war. Mao has aptly compared guerrillas to fish, and the people to the water in which they swim. If the political temperature is right the fish, however few in number, will thrive and proliferate. It is therefore the principal concern of all guerrilla leaders to get the water to the right temperature and to keep it there.

Over ten years ago I concluded an analysis of guerrilla warfare with the suggestion that the problem urgently demanded further "serious study of all historical experience". Although a wealth of material existed then, and much more has since been developed, no such study has yet been undertaken in this country, so far as I am aware. In Indo-China and Cuba Ho Chi-minh and Ernesto (Che) Guevara were more assiduous. One rather interesting result of their successful activities has been the common identification of guerrilla warfare with communism. But guerrilla warfare was not invented by the communists. For centuries there have been guerrilla fighters.

One of the most accomplished of them all was our own Revolutionary hero,

Francis Marion, "The Swamp Fox". Those present at his birth would perhaps not have foretold a martial future for him: the baby was "not larger than a New England lobster and might easily enough have been put into a quart pot." Marion grew up in South Carolina and had little formal schooling. He was a farmer. In 1759, at the age of 27, he joined a regiment raised to fight the Cherokees, who were then ravaging the borders of the Carolinas. For two years he served and in the course of these hostilities stored away in his mind much that was later to be put to good use against the British.

When the Revolution broke out Marion immediately accepted a commission in the Second South Carolina Regiment. By 1780 he had seen enough of the war to realize that the Continentals were overlooking a very profitable field - that of partisan warfare. Accordingly he sought and obtained permission to organize a company which at first consisted of twenty (Castro's "base" was twelve men). ill-equipped men and boys. The appearance of this group, with a heterogeneous assortment of arms and in ragged and poorly fitting clothes provoked considerable jesting among the regulars of General Gates, but Marion's men were not long in proving that the appearance of a combat soldier is not always a reliable criterion of his fighting abilities.

Marion's guerrilla activities in South Carolina soon told heavily on the British and most seriously inconvenienced Cornwallis, whose plans were continually disrupted by them. His tactics were those of all successful guerrillas. Operating with the greatest speed from inaccessible bases which he changed frequently, he struck his blows in rapid succes-

sion at isolated garrisons, convoys and trains. His information was always timely and accurate, for the people supported him.

The British, unable to cope with Marion, branded him a criminal, and complained bitterly that he fought neither "like a gentleman" nor "a Christian", a charge which orthodox soldiers are wont to apply in all lands and in all wars to such ubiquitous, intangible and deadly antagonists as Francis Marion.*

However, the first example of guerrilla operations on a grand scale was in Spain between the years 1808 and 1813. The Spaniards who fled from Napoleon's invading army to the mountains were patriots loyal to the ruler whose crown had been taken from him by the Emperor of the French. They were not revolutionists. Most did not desire a change in the form of their government. Their single objective was to help Wellington force the French armies to leave Spain.

*Bryant, in The Song of Marion's Men, wrote ^{some lines} ~~one verse~~ that showed that he had a better understanding of guerrilla tactics and psychology than many who have followed more martial pursuits:

"Woe to the English soldiery,
That little dreads us near!
On them shall come at midnight
A strange and sudden fear;
When, waking to their tents on fire
They grasp their arms in vain,
And they who stand to face us
Are beat to earth again;
And they who fly in terror deem
A mighty host behind,
And hear the tramp of thousands
Upon the hollow wind."

A few years later thousands of Russian Cossacks and peasants harried Napoleon's Grande Armee ~~as it stumbled~~, *as Kutuzov pushed it, stumbling,* starving and freezing, down the ice-covered road to Smolensk. This dying army felt again and again the cudgel of the people's war which, as Tolstoi later wrote, "was raised in all its menacing and majestic power; and troubling itself about no question of anyone's tastes or rules, about no fine distinctions, with stupid simplicity, with perfect consistency, it rose and fell and belaboured the French until the whole invading army had been driven out."

A little more than a century and a quarter later Hitler's armies fell back along the Smolensk road. They too would feel the fury of an aroused people. But in neither case were those who wielded the cudgel revolutionists. They were patriotic Russians.

Only when Lenin came on the scene did guerrilla warfare receive the potent political injection that was to alter its character radically. But it remained for Mao Tse-tung to produce the first systematic study of the subject. This appeared in a treatise written almost twenty-five years ago. His study, now endowed with the authority which deservedly accrues to the works of a man who led the most radical revolution in history, will continue to have a decisive effect in societies ready for change.

II

Profile of a Revolutionist

"Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."
Mao Tse-tung, 1938

Mao Tse-tung, the man who was to don the mantle of Lenin, was born in Hunan Province in central China in 1893. His father, an industrious farmer, had managed to acquire several acres, and with this land the status of a "middle" peasant. He was a strict disciplinarian, and Mao's youth was not a happy one. The boy was in constant conflict with his father, but found an ally in his mother, whose "indirect tactics" (as he once described her methods of coping with her husband) appealed to him. But the father gave his rebellious son educational opportunities which only a tiny minority of Chinese were then able to enjoy. Mao's primary and secondary schooling was thorough. His literary taste was catholic; while a pupil at the provincial normal school he read omnivorously. This indiscriminate diet included Chinese philosophy, poetry, history and romances as well as translations of many western historians, novelists and biographers. However, history and political sciences particularly appealed to him; in them, he sought, but without success, the key to the future of China.

His studies had led him to reject both democratic liberalism and parliamentary socialism as unsuited to his country. Time, he realized, was running out for China. History would not accord her the privilege of gradual political, social and economic change; of a relatively painless and orderly evolution. To survive in the power jungle, China had to change,

to change radically, to change fast. But how?

Shortly after graduating from Normal School in 1917, Mao accepted a position as assistant in the Peking University library. Here he associated himself with the Marxist study groups set up by Li Tao-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu; here he discovered Lenin, read his essays, pored over Trotsky's explosive speeches, and began to study Marx and Engels. By 1920, Mao was a convinced communist and a man who had discovered his mission: to create a new China according to the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. When the C.C.P. was organized in Shanghai in 1921, Mao joined.

The China Mao decided to change was not a nation in the accepted sense of the word. Culturally, China was of course homogeneous; politically and economically China was chaos. The peasants, four hundred million of them, lived from day to day at subsistence level. Tens of millions of peasant families owned no land at all. Other millions cultivated tiny holdings from which they scraped out enough food to sustain life.

The peasant was fair game for everyone. Pillaged by tax collectors, robbed by landlords and usurers, at the mercy of rapacious soldiery and bandits, afflicted by blights, droughts, floods and epidemics, his single stark problem was simply to survive. The tough ones did. The others slowly starved, died of disease, and in the fierce winters of North China and Manchuria, froze to death.

It is difficult for an American today to conceive tens of thousands of small communities in which no public services existed, in which there

were no doctors, no schools, no running water, no electricity, no paved streets and no sewage disposal. The inhabitants of these communities were with few exceptions illiterate; they lived in constant fear of army press gangs and of provincial officials who called them out summer and winter alike to work on military roads and dikes. The Chinese peasant, in his own expressive idiom, "ate bitterness" from the time he could walk until he was laid to rest in the burial plot beneath the cypress trees. This was feudal China. Dormant within this society were the ingredients which were soon to blow it to pieces.

An external factor had for almost a century contributed to the chaos of China: the unrelenting pressure and greed of foreign powers. French, British, Germans and Russians vied with one another in exacting from a succession of corrupt and feeble governments commercial, juridical and financial concessions which had de facto turned China into an international colony. Mao once described the China he knew in his youth as "semi-colonial and feudal". He was right.

Shortly after Chiang K'ai Shek took command of the National Revolutionary Army in 1926, Mao went to Hunan to stir up the peasants. The campaign he waged for land reform in his native province can almost be described as a one-man show. The fundamental requisite in China was then, as it had long been, to solve the land question. Reduced to elementary terms, the problem was how to get rid of the gentry land-owners who fastened themselves to the peasants like so many leeches and whose

exactions kept the people constantly impoverished. In the circumstances there was only one way to accomplish this necessary reform: expropriation and redistribution of the land. Naturally, the Nationalists, eager to retain the support of the gentry (historically the stabilizing element in Chinese society) considered such a radical solution social dynamite. But in Mao's view there could be no meaningful revolution unless and until the power of this very class had been completely eliminated.

While Mao was making himself extremely unpopular with the landed gentry in Hunan the revolutionary armies of the Kuo Min Tang were marching north from Canton to Wuhan on the Yangtze, where a Nationalist government was established in December 1926. These armies incorporated a number of communist elements. But by the time the vanguard divisions of Chiang's army reached the outskirts of Shanghai in March 1927, the honeymoon was almost over. In April, Chiang's secret police captured and executed the radical labor leaders in Shanghai and began to purge the army of its communist elements. In the meantime the left-wing government in Wuhan had broken up. The communists walked out; the Soviet advisors packed their bags and started for home.

While the Generalissimo was thus engaged, the communists were having their own troubles, and these were serious. The movement was literally on the verge of extinction. Those who managed to escape Chiang's secret police had fled to the south and assembled at Ching Kang Shan, a rugged area in the Fukien-Kiangsi borderlands. One of the first to reach this haven was the agrarian agitator from Hunan. As various groups

drifted in to the mountain stronghold, Mao and Chu Teh (who had arrived in April 1928) began to mould an army. Several local bandit chieftains were induced to join the communists, whose operations gradually became more extensive. Principally these were of a propaganda nature. District Soviets were established; landlords were dispossessed; wealthy merchants were "asked" to make patriotic contributions. Gradually the territory under Red control expanded and from a base area temporarily secure, operations commenced against provincial troops who were supposed to suppress the Reds.

In the early summer of 1930 an ominous directive was received at Ching Kang Shan from the Central Committee of the party, then dominated by Li Li-san. This directive required the communist armies to take the offensive against cities held by the Nationalists. The campaigns which followed were not entirely successful, and culminated in a serious communist defeat at Ch'ang Sha in September. On the thirteenth of that month the single most vital decision in the history of the Chinese Communist Party was taken; the ultimate responsibility for it rested equally on the shoulders of Mao and Chu Teh. These two agreed that the only hope for the movement was to abandon immediately the line prescribed by Moscow in favor of one of Mao's own devising. Basically the conflict which split the Chinese Communist Party wide open and which alienated the traditionalists in Moscow revolved about this question: Was the Chinese revolution to be based on the industrial proletariat - as Marxist dogma prescribed - or was it to be based on the peasant? Mao, who

knew and trusted the peasants, and had correctly gauged their revolutionary potential, was convinced that the Chinese urban proletariat were too few in number and too apathetic to make a revolution. This decision, which drastically re-oriented the policy of the Chinese Communist Party, was thereafter to be carried out with vigorous consistency. History has proved that Mao was right, Moscow wrong. And it is for this reason that the doctrine of Kremlin infallibility is so frequently challenged by Peking.

In October, 1930 the Generalissimo, in the misguided belief that he could crush the communists with no difficulty, announced with great fanfare a "Bandit Suppression Campaign". This was launched in December. How weak the Nationalists really were was now to become apparent. The campaign was a complete flop. Government troops ran away or surrendered to the communists by platoons, by companies, by battalions. Three more "Suppression" campaigns, all failures, followed this fiasco. Finally, in 1933, the Generalissimo reluctantly decided to adopt the plans of his German advisors and to commit well-equipped, well-trained and loyal "Central" divisions to a coordinated and methodical compression of the communist-controlled area. As the Nationalists inched southward, supported by artillery and aviation, they evacuated peasants from every village and town and constructed hundreds of mutually supporting wired-in blockhouses. The communists, isolated from the support of the peasants they had laboriously converted, found themselves for the first time almost completely deprived of food and information. Chiang's

troops were slowly strangling the communists. For the first time, communist morale sagged. It was in this context that the bold decision to shift the base to Shensi province was taken, and the now celebrated march of almost six thousand miles was begun.

This was indeed one of the fateful migrations of history: its purpose, to preserve the military power of the Communist Party. How many pitched battles and skirmishes the Reds fought during this epic trek cannot now be established. It is known however that for days on end their columns were under air attack. They crossed innumerable mountains and rivers and endured both tropical and sub-arctic climates. As they marched toward the borders of Tibet and swung north, they sprinkled the route with cadres and caches of arms and ammunition.

The Reds faced many critical situations but they were tough and determined. Every natural obstacle, and there were many, was overcome. Chiang's provincial troops, ineffective as usual, were unable to bar the way, and the exhausted remnants eventually found shelter in the loess caves of Pao An.

Later, after the base was shifted to Yen-an, Mao had time to reflect on his experiences and to derive from them the theory and doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla war which he embodied in Yu Chi Chan.

III

Strategy, Tactics and Logistics in Revolutionary War

"The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy."

Mao Tse-tung, 1937

Mao has never claimed that guerrilla action alone is decisive in a struggle for political control of the state, but only that it is a possible, natural and necessary development in an agrarian-based revolutionary war.

Mao conceived this type of war as passing through a series of merging phases, the first of which is devoted to organization, consolidation and preservation of regional base areas situated in isolated and difficult terrain. Here volunteers are trained and indoctrinated, and from here agitators and propagandists set forth, individually or in small groups of two or three, to "persuade" and "convince" the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside and to enlist their support. In effect, there is thus woven about each base a protective belt of sympathizers willing to supply food, recruits and information. The pattern of the process is conspiratorial, clandestine, methodical and progressive. Military operations will be sporadic.

In the next phase direct action assumes an ever increasing importance. Acts of sabotage and terrorism multiply; collaborationists and "reactionary elements" are liquidated. Attacks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts; weak columns are ambushed. The primary

purpose of these operations is to procure arms, ammunition and other essential material, particularly medical supplies and radios. As the growing guerrilla force becomes better equipped and its capabilities improve, political agents proceed with indoctrination of the inhabitants of peripheral districts soon to be absorbed into the expanding "liberated" area.

One of the primary objectives during the first phases is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the movement, so that it gradually acquires the quality of "mass". Local "home guards" or militia are formed. The militia is not primarily designed to be a mobile fighting force; it is a "back-up" for the better trained and equipped guerrillas. The home guards form an indoctrinated and partially trained reserve. They function as vigilantes. They collect information, force merchants to make "voluntary" contributions, kidnap particularly obnoxious local landlords and liquidate informers and collaborators. Their function is to protect the revolution.

Following Phase I (organization, consolidation and preservation) and Phase II (progressive expansion) comes Phase III: decision, or destruction of the enemy. It is during this period that a significant percentage of the active guerrilla force completes its transformation into an orthodox establishment capable of engaging the enemy in conventional battle. This phase may be protracted by "negotiations". Such negotiations are not originated by revolutionists for the purpose of arriving at amicable arrangements with the opposition. Revolutions rarely compromise: compromises are made only to further the strategic design. Negotiation, then,

is undertaken for the dual purpose of gaining time to buttress a position (military, political, social, economic) and to wear down, frustrate and harass the opponent. Few, if any, essential concessions are to be expected from the revolutionary side, whose aim is only to create conditions which will preserve the unity of the strategic line and guarantee the development of a "victorious situation".

Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations. "Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does he propose to do? What is the state of his equipment, his supply; his morale? Are his leaders intelligent, bold and imaginative or stupid and impetuous? Are his troops tough, efficient and well disciplined, or poorly trained and soft?" Guerrillas expect the members of their intelligence service to provide the answers to these and dozens more detailed questions.

Guerrilla intelligence nets are tightly organized and pervasive. In a guerrilla area every person without exception must be considered an agent. Old men and women, boys driving ox carts, girls tending goats, farm laborers, store-keepers, school teachers, priests, boatmen, scavengers. The local cadres "put the heat" on everyone without regard to age or sex to produce all conceivable information. And produce it they do.

As a corollary, guerrillas deny all information of themselves to their enemy who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog. Total inability to get information was a constant complaint of the Nationalists during the first four *"Bandit Suppression"* ~~extermination campaigns~~ as it was later of the Japanese in

China and of the French in both Indo-China and Algeria. This is a characteristic feature of all guerrilla wars. The enemy stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around him thousands of unseen eyes study intently his every move, his every gesture. When he strikes out he hits the air; his antagonists are insubstantial, as intangible as fleeting shadows in the moonlight.

Because of superior information guerrillas always engage under conditions of their own choosing; because of superior knowledge of terrain they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy's discomforture. Guerrillas fight only when the chances of victory are weighted heavily in their favor; if the tide of battle unexpectedly flows against them they withdraw. They rely on imaginative leadership, distraction, surprise and mobility to create a victorious situation before battle is joined. The enemy is deceived and again deceived. Attacks are sudden, sharp, vicious and of short duration. Many are harrassing in nature; others designed to dislocate the enemy's plans and to agitate and confuse his commanders. The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops. ^RMao once remarked, not entirely facetiously, that guerrillas must be expert at running away, since they do it so often. They avoid static dispositions; their effort is always to keep the situation as fluid as possible; to strike where and when the enemy least expects them. Only in this way can they retain the initiative and so be assured of freedom of action. Usually designed to lure the enemy into a baited trap, to confuse his

leadership, or to distract his attention from an area in which a more decisive blow is imminent, "running away" is thus paradoxically offensive.

Guerrilla operations conducted over a wide region are necessarily decentralized. Each regional commander must be familiar with local conditions and is expected to take advantage of local opportunities. The same applies to commands in subordinate districts. This decentralization is to some extent forced upon guerrillas because they ordinarily lack a well-developed system of technical communications. But at the same time decentralization for normal operations has many advantages, particularly if local leaders are ingenious and bold.

The enemy's rear is the guerrillas' front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical problems are solved in a direct and elementary fashion: the enemy is the principal source of weapons, equipment and ammunition.

Mao once said:

We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and, what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke.

If it is a joke, it is a macabre one as far as American tax payers are concerned. Defectors to the communists from Chiang K'ai-shek's American-equipped divisions were numbered in the tens of thousands. When they ~~went~~ *surrendered, they turned in* ~~over, they took with them~~ mountains of American-made individual arms, jeeps, tanks, guns, bazookas, mortars, radios and automatic weapons.

It is interesting to examine Mao's strategical and tactical theories in the light of his principle of "unity of opposites". This seems to be an adaptation to military action of the ancient Chinese philosophical concept of Yin-Yang. Briefly, the Yin and the Yang are elemental and pervasive. Of opposite polarities, they represent ^{female and} ~~male and female~~, ^{light} ~~light~~ and ^{dark} ~~dark~~, ^{heat} ~~heat~~ and ^{cold} ~~cold~~, ^{aggression} ~~aggression~~ and ^{recession} ~~recession~~. Their reciprocal interaction is endless. In terms of the dialectic, they may be likened to the thesis and antithesis from which the synthesis is derived.

An important postulate of the Yin-Yang theory is that concealed within strength there is weakness and within weakness, strength. It is a weakness of guerrillas that they operate in small groups which can be wiped out in a matter of minutes. But simply because they do operate in small groups they can move rapidly and secretly into the vulnerable rear of the enemy.

In conventional tactics, dispersion of forces invites destruction; in guerrilla war this very tactic is desirable both to confuse the enemy and to preserve the illusion that the guerrillas are ubiquitous.

It is often a disadvantage not to have heavy infantry weapons available, but the very fact of having to transport them has until recently tied conventional columns to roads and well-used tracks. The guerrilla travels light and travels fast. He turns the hazards of terrain to his advantage and makes tropical rains, heavy snow, intense heat and freezing cold his ally. Long night marches are difficult and dangerous, but the darkness shields his approach to an unsuspecting enemy.

In every apparent disadvantage there is some advantage to be found. The converse is equally true: in each apparent advantage lie the seeds of disadvantage. The Yin is not wholly Yin, nor the Yang wholly Yang. It is only the wise general, said the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, who is able to recognize this fact and to turn it to good account.

Guerrilla tactical doctrine may be summarized in four Chinese characters pronounced Cheng Tung, Chi Hsi, which means "Uproar (in) East; Strike (in) West". Here we find expressed the all-important principles of distraction on the one hand and concentration on the other; to fix the enemy's attention and to strike where and when he least anticipates the blow.

Guerrillas are masters of the arts of simulation and dissimulation; they create pretenses and simultaneously disguise or conceal their true semblance. Their tactical concepts, dynamic and flexible, are not out to any particular pattern. But Mao's first law of war, to preserve one's self and destroy the enemy, is always governing.

IV

Some Conclusions

"Historical experience is written
in blood and iron."

Mao Tse-tung, 1937

The fundamental difference between patriotic partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological content which always distinguishes the second.

A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.

A resistance is rarely liquidated, and terminates when the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent government or is liquidated.

Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a decisive figure might range from fifteen to twenty-five percent.

In addition to an appealing program and popular support, such factors as terrain, communications, the quality of the opposing leadership, the presence or absence of material help, technical aid, advisors or "volunteers" from outside sources, the availability of a sanctuary, the relative military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incum-

bent government are naturally relevant to the ability of a movement to survive and expand.

In specific aspects, revolutionary guerrilla situations will of course differ, but if the Castro movement, for example, had been objectively analyzed in the light of the factors suggested during the latter period of its first phase, a rough "expectation of survival and growth" might have looked something like that below.

(Determinants are arbitrarily weighted on a scale of 0 - 10.)

<u>Determinants</u>	<u>Castro</u>	<u>Incumbent (Batista)</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1. Appeal of Program	Progressive; Plus (8)	Static; Minus (3)	Batista government oppressive and reactionary
2. Popular Support	Growing; Active (7)	Diminishing; Passive (3)	
3. Quality of Leadership	Excellent, dedicated (8)	Mediocre to poor (4)	
4. Quality of Troops	Good, improving to excellent (8)	Good, decreasing to fair (5)	
5. Military Efficiency	Growing (6)	Mediocre to poor (4)	In guerrilla situations
6. Internal Unity	Positive, strong (8)	Weak (3)	
7. Equipment	Poor, improving to good as taken (4)	Largely U.S., excellent (8)	Radios, transport, medical supplies etc. available from enemy
8. Base Area terrain	Operationally favorable (10)	Unfavorable (3)	
9. Base Area Communications	Operationally favorable (10)	Unfavorable (3)	
10. Sanctuary	None (0)	Remainder of island (10)	Available for rest, re-training, equipment

Had an impartial analyst applied such criteria to Vietnam six to eight months before the final debacle, he might have produced a chart more or less similar to that below:

<u>Determinants</u>	<u>Ho Chih-min</u>	<u>Incumbent (French)</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1. Appeal of Program	Dynamic (7)	No program (0)	
2. Popular Support	Growing (7)	Diminishing, Slight (3)	
3. Quality of Leadership	Good (7)	Good (7)	
4. Quality of Troops	Good, improving (6)	Very good (7)	
5. Military Efficiency	Very good (8)	Good (6)	In guerrilla situations
6. Internal Unity	Excellent (8)	Excellent (8)	
7. Equipment	Fair but improving (7)	Generally well equipped (9)	Received from China and taken from French
8. Operational Terrain	Favorable (10)	Unfavorable (5)	
9. Operational Area Communications	Favorable (10)	Unfavorable (5)	
10. Sanctuary	Available in China (8)	Remainder of Indo-China (10)	
Aggregate		(78)	(60)

Here determinants 1, 2, 8 and 9 definitely favored the guerrillas, who also (unlike Castro) had an available sanctuary. Two others, 3 and 6, might have been considered in balance. Although the Viet Minh had demonstrated superior tactical ability in guerrilla situations, an experienced observer might have been justified in weighing "military efficiency" equally; the French were learning.

While other determinants may no doubt be adduced, those used are, I believe, valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative. These show that Castro's chances of success might have been estimated as approximately ~~two to one~~ ^{three to two}, Ho Chi-min's as approximately four to three.

These analyses may be criticised as having been formulated after the event; it is, however, my belief that the outcome in Cuba and Indo-China could have been predicted some time before the respective movements had emerged from the stage of organization and consolidation - Phase I.

At the present time much attention is being devoted to the development of "gadgets". A good example of this restricted approach to the problem was recently reported in "Newsweek" ("The Periscope", July 3rd 1961).

PENTAGON - A new and fiendishly ingenious anti-guerrilla weapon is being tested by the Navy. It's a delayed-action liquid explosive, squirted from a flame-thrower-like gun, that seeps into foxholes and bunkers. Seconds later, fed by oxygen from the air, it blows up with terrific force.

Apparently we are to assume that guerrillas will conveniently ensconce themselves in readily identifiable "foxholes and bunkers" awaiting the arrival of half a dozen admirals armed with "flame-thrower-like guns" to march up, squirt, and retire to the nearest officers' club. To anyone even remotely acquainted with the philosophy and doctrine of

revolutionary guerrilla war, this sort of thing is not hilariously funny. There are no mechanical panaceas.

I do not mean to suggest that proper weapons and equipment will not play an important part in anti-guerrilla operations, for of course they will. Constant efforts should be made to improve communication, food, medical and surgical "packs". Weapons and ammunition must be drastically reduced in weight; there would seem to be no technical reason why a sturdy, light, accurate automatic rifle weighing a maximum of four to five pounds cannot be developed. And the search for new and effective weapons must continue. But we must realize that "flame-thrower-like" guns and bullets are only a very small part of the answer to a challenging and complex problem.

The position of active third parties in a revolutionary guerrilla war and the timing, nature and scope of the assistance given to one side or the other has become of great importance. Basically, this is a political matter; responsibility for a decision to intervene would naturally devolve upon the head of state. What assistance is given should, however, stop short of participation in combat. The role of a third party should be restricted to advice, materials and technical training. *The timing of aid is often critical.*
~~We must carefully consider timing.~~ If extended to the incumbent government, aid must be given while it is still possible to isolate and eradicate the movement; if to the revolutionary side, made available during the same critical period - that is, when the movement is vulnerable and its existence quite literally a matter of life and death.

From a purely military point of view, anti-guerrilla operations may be summed up in three words: location, isolation and eradication. In briefly defining each term, it will be well to bear in mind the fact that these activities are not rigidly compartmented.

Location of base area or areas requires careful terrain studies, photographic and physical reconnaissance and possibly infiltration of the movement. Isolation involves separation of guerrillas from their sources of information and food. It may involve movement and re-settlement of entire communities. Eradication presupposes reliable information and demands extreme operational flexibility and a high degree of mobility. Parachutists and helicopter-borne commando-type troops are essential.

The tactics of guerrillas must be used against them. They must be constantly harried and constantly attacked. Every effort must be made to induce defections and take prisoners. The best source of information of the enemy is men who know the enemy situation.

Imaginative, intelligent and bold leadership is absolutely essential. Commanders and leaders at every echelon must be selected with these specific qualities in mind. Officers and N.C.O.'s who are more than competent under normal conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristic of guerrilla warfare.

Finally, there is the question of whether it is possible to create effective counter-guerrilla forces. Can two shoals of fish, each intent

on destruction of the other, flourish in the same medium? Mao is definite on this point; he is convinced they cannot; that "counter-revolutionary guerrilla war" is impossible. If the guerrilla experience of the White Russians (which he cites) or of Mihailovich are valid criteria he is correct. But, on the other hand, the history of the movement in Greece during the German occupation indicates that under certain circumstances, his thesis will not stand too close an examination. This suggests the need for a careful analysis of relevant political factors in each individual situation.

Mao Tse-tung contends that the phenomena we have considered are subject to their own peculiar laws, and are predictable. If he is correct (and I believe he is) it is possible to prevent such phenomena from appearing, or, if they do, to control and eradicate them. And if historical experience teaches us anything about ^{coping with} revolutionary guerrilla war it is that military measures alone will not suffice.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, CA Staff Attn: 	STAT	22 AUG 1961
2	<i>R/CA</i>	<i>RA</i>	
3	<i>DDP - 1061 "L"</i>		
4	<i>ADD P/A</i>		
5			
6	<i>Letter - Prepare, attach when considered.</i>		

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The Director would like to have a
thank-you letter prepared for his signature
and also would like to have your good comments.

STAT

SUSPENSE: 25 August 1961

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
 ASST. to the DCI	8/21/61

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